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Abstract—Research in the area of automatic speaker verifi-
cation (ASV) has advanced enough for the industry to start
using ASV systems in practical applications. However, these
systems are highly vulnerable to spoofing or presentation attacks,
limiting their wide deployment. Therefore, it is important to
develop mechanisms that can detect such attacks, and it is equally
important for these mechanisms to be seamlessly integrated into
existing ASV systems for practical and attack-resistant solutions.
To be practical, however, an attack detection should have (i) high
accuracy, (ii) be well-generalized for different attacks, and (iii)
be simple and efficient. Several audio-based presentation attack
detection (PAD) methods have been proposed recently but their
evaluation was usually done on a single, often obscure, database
with limited number of attacks. Therefore, in this paper, we con-
duct an extensive study of eight state of the art PAD methods and
evaluate their ability to detect known and unknown attacks (e.g.,
in a cross-database scenario) using two major publicly available
speaker databases with spoofing attacks: AVspoof and ASVspoof.
We investigate whether combining several PAD systems via score
fusion can improve attack detection accuracy. We also study
the impact of fusing PAD systems (via parallel and cascading
schemes) with two i-vector and inter-session variability (ISV)-
based ASV systems on the overall performance in both bona fide
(no attacks) and spoof scenarios. The evaluation results question
the efficiency and practicality of the existing PAD systems,
especially when comparing results for individual databases and
cross-database data. Fusing several PAD systems can lead to
a slightly improved performance, however, how to select which
systems to fuse remains an open question. Joint ASV-PAD systems
show a significantly increased resistance to the attacks at the
expense of slightly degraded performance for bona fide scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have shown an increase in both the accuracy
of biometric systems and their practical use. The applica-
tion of biometrics is becoming widespread with fingerprint
sensors in smartphones, automatic face recognition in social
networks and video-based applications, and speaker recogni-
tion in phone banking and other phone-based services. The
popularization of the biometric systems, however, exposed
their major flaw — high vulnerability to spoofing attacks [1].
A fingerprint sensor can be easily tricked with a simple glue-
made mold, a face recognition system can be accessed using a
printed photo, and a speaker recognition system can be spoofed
with a replay of pre-recorded voice. The ease with which a
biometric system can be spoofed demonstrates the importance
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Fig. 1: Possible attack places in a typical ASV system.
of developing efficient anti-spoofing systems that can detect
both known (conceivable now) and unknown (possible in the
future) spoofing attacks.
In this paper, we focus on the spoofing attack detection or
presentation attack detection (PAD) systems in the context of
voice biometrics and their integration with automatic speaker
verification (ASV) systems. Ideally, the final joint ASV-PAD
system should be resistant to presentation attacks just like its
PAD component and, in the same time, have the same veri-
fication accuracy as its ASV component, while generalizing
well across different types of genuine and attack data.
Given the complexity of a practical ASV system, several
different modules of the system are prone to attacks, as it is
identified in ISO/IEC 30107-1 standard [2] and illustrated by
Figure 1. Depending on the usage scenario, two of the most
vulnerable places in an ASV system are marked by ‘A1’ (aka
‘physical access’ as defined in [3] or presentation attacks) and
‘A2’ (aka ‘logical access’ attacks as defined in [3]) in the
figure. In this paper, we consider both logical access and pre-
sentation attacks but we focus on presentation attacks, because
they are often easier to perform, e.g., replay attacks require
no special knowledge of voice conversion or speech synthesis
algorithms, and they are considered to be a serious threat
by the industry, as reflected in the standard [2]. Presentation
attacks assume that either a stolen set of user’s samples or
an automatically generated set of samples is replayed to a
microphone of the ASV system under attack with an attempt
to mimic the genuine registered user.
According to a comprehensive recent survey by Wu et
al. [4], most of the available work on anti-spoofing focuses
on synthetic attacks, such as voice conversion and speech
synthesis. Researchers typically resort to taking databases
designed for verification and identification tasks and adding
synthetically generated spoofing attacks, such as voice conver-
2sion or speech synthesis, since they do not require additional
lengthy recording sessions. This approach led to the lack of
easily available databases with replay attacks and shaped the
anti-spoofing research in the direction that focused mostly on
the synthetic attacks detection.
That is why the most commonly used public database
for evaluation of PAD systems, ASVspoof1 [3], created as
part of the 2015 Interspeech anti-spoofing challenge, contains
only synthetically generated spoofing attacks. These attacks
are assumed to be fed into a verification system directly
bypassing its microphone, and are also coined as logical access
attacks [3].
Recently, a database, called AVspoof2 [5], with several
replay-based attacks (logical access attacks are also provided)
became publicly available. It contains a comprehensive set of
presentation attacks, including, (i) the direct replay attacks
when a genuine data is played back using a laptop and two
phones (Samsung Galaxy S4 and iPhone 3G), (ii) synthe-
sized speech replayed with a laptop, and (iii) an attack data,
generated using a voice conversion algorithm, replayed with
a laptop. The release of this database gives an opportunity
to investigate the performance of current PAD methods on
replay-based attacks and to evaluate how well these methods
generalize across different types of data.
Therefore, taking the recent work of Sahidullah et al. [6],
which benchmarked several anti-spoofing systems, as a starting
point, we have performed a preliminary study of several PAD
methods in cross-database scenario [7], as well as, fusion of
PAD with ASV systems [8]. This paper extends the prelimi-
nary work by investigating the impact of several score fusion
methods on PAD and joint ASV-PAD performances. The raw
scores are also calibrated, so that they can be interpreted as
practically useful likelihood ratios.
For the evaluations, we have selected eight well-performing
methods and developed their open source implementation
based on a well-known Bob framework [9]3. Hence, we
have implemented: GMM-based classifier using cepstral-
based features with rectangular (RFCC), mel-scale triangular
(MFCC) [10], inverted mel-scale triangular (IMFCC), and lin-
ear triangular (LFCC) filters [11], spectral flux-based features
(SSFC) [12], subband centroid frequency (SCFC) [13], and
subband centroid magnitude (SCMC) [13] features. We also
included recently proposed constant Q cepstral coefficients
(CQCCs) [14], which were shown good performance on
ASVspoof database4. Figure 5 illustrates the processing flow
of the implemented PAD systems.
We first evaluate these selected PAD systems on ASVspoof
and AVspoof databases, and then, to understand how well
the systems can generalize across different types of data and
attacks, we conducted an extensive cross-database evaluation
by training the systems on data from one database and testing
them on data from another database. The aim of these evalua-
tions is to demonstrate the importance of presentation attacks
1http://datashare.is.ed.ac.uk/handle/10283/853
2https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/avspoof
3http://idiap.github.io/bob/
4Precomputed CQCC features were provided by the authors.
and to understand how efficient and practical the currently
available PAD systems are.
In addition to evaluating individual PAD methods, we
also evaluated joint PAD systems obtained by fusing several
systems via score fusion approach, using mean, logistic regres-
sion, and polynomial logistic regression fusion methods. The
correct performance of the fusion is ensured by using scores
pre-calibrated with logistic regression.
However, having presentation attack detection methods is
not enough for practical use. Such PAD systems should
be seamlessly and effectively integrated with existing ASV
systems. In this paper, we integrate speaker verification and
presentation attack detection systems (individual and fused
PAD systems) also by using score fusion, but in addition to
parallel scheme (see Figure 3), we also consider cascading fu-
sion (see Figure 2). The score fusion-based integration allows
to separate bona fide data of the valid users, who are trying
to be verified by the system, from both presentation attacks
and genuine data of the non-valid users or so-called zero-
impostors. For ASV system, we adopt verification approaches
based on inter-session variability (ISV) modeling [15] and
i-vectors [16], as the state of the art systems for speaker
verification.
To allow researchers to verify, reproduce, and improve
our work, we provide all implementations of PAD and ASV
systems, as well as fusion, considered in this paper as an open
source package available to public5.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• An extensive evaluation of PAD systems and their fusion-
based derivatives on AVspoof and ASVspoof databases,
including a cross-database scenario;
• Integration of different PAD and ASV systems into one
joint ASV-PAD system based on parallel and cascading
score fusion techniques;
• Open source implementation of seven state of the art PAD
systems, fusion tools, and evaluation framework;
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The research on presentation attack detection is far from be-
ing matured, especially, if compared to the significant advances
in speech analysis and speaker verification. In this section, we
provide an overview of the most typical features and classifiers
used in PAD systems and discuss score fusion technique of
joining several systems together.
A. Features
A survey by Wu et al. [4] provides a comprehensive
overview of the spoofing attacks and the currently available
attack detection methods. These methods use features mostly
based on the audio spectrogram, such as spectral- and cepstral-
based features [17], phase-based features [18], the combination
of amplitude and phase features [19], and audio quality based
features [20]. Features directly extracted from a spectrogram
can also be used, as per the recent work that relies on local
maxima of spectrogram [21], which showed an impressive
5https://pypi.python.org/pypi/bob.paper.jstsp 2017
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performance, albeit for the evaluation database that was based
on a set of speech recordings collected with VoIP phones,
which provided little challenge for an anti-spoofing system.
Constant Q cepstral coefficients (CQCCs) [14] features were
proposed recently and they have shown a superior performance
in detecting both know and unknown attacks in ASVspoof
database. Also, a higher computational layer can be added,
for instance, Alegre et al. [22] proposed to use histograms of
Local Binary Patterns (LBP), which can be computed directly
from a set of pre-selected spectral, phase-based, or other
features.
B. Classifiers
Besides determining ‘good features for detecting presen-
tation attacks’, it is also important to correctly classify the
computed feature vectors as belonging to bona fide or spoofed
data. Choosing a reliable classifier is especially important
given a possibly unpredictable nature of attacks in a practical
system, since it is not known in advance what kind of attack
the perpetrator may use. The most common approach to
classification is to use one of the well-known classifiers, which
is usually pre-trained on the examples of both real and spoofed
data. To simulate realistic environments, the classifier can be
trained on a subset of the attacks, termed known attacks, and
tested on the larger set of attacks that include both known and
unknown attacks.
Different methods use different classifiers but the most com-
mon choices include logistic regression, support vector ma-
chine (SVM), and Gaussian mixture model (GMM) classifiers.
The benchmarking study on logical access attacks [6] finds
GMMs to be more successful compared to two-class SVM
(combined with an LBP-based feature extraction from [22]) in
detecting synthetic spoofing attacks. Deep learning networks
are also showing promising performance in simultaneous
feature selection and classification [23].
The research on automatic speaker verification is more
established with regular competitions conducted by National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) since 19966.
Many techniques have been proposed with the most notable
systems based on GMM, inter-session variability (ISV) mod-
eling [15], joint factor analysis (JFA) [24], and i-vectors [16].
In this paper, we consider ASV systems based on ISV and
i-vectors, as they represent the state of the art systems for
speech verification.
C. Score fusion
In this paper, we focus on a score level fusion as a means
to integrate different PAD systems or ASV and PAD systems
into one joint system. Due to relative simplicity of such
fusion and the evidence that it leads to a better performing
combined systems, this operation has become popular among
researchers. However, the danger is to rely on score fusion
blindly without studying how it can affect different systems in
different scenarios.
One way to fuse ASV and PAD or several PAD systems at
the score level is to use a parallel scheme, as it is illustrated
in Figure 3. In this case, the scores from each of N system
are combined into a new feature vector of length N that
needs to be classified. The classification task can be performed
using different approaches, and, in this paper, we consider
three different algorithms: (i) a logistic regression classifier,
denoted as ‘LR’, which leads to a straight line separation,
(ii) a polynomial logistic regression, denoted as ‘PLR’, which
results in a polynomial separation line, and (iii) a simple mean
function, denoted as ‘Mean’, which is taken on scores of the
fused systems. For ‘LR’ and ‘PLR’ fusion, the classifier is
pre-trained on the score-feature vectors from a training set.
Another common way, especially to combine PAD and ASV
systems is a cascading scheme, in which one system is used
first and only the samples that are accepted by this system
(based on its own threshold) are then passed to the second
system, which will further filter the samples, using its own
independently determined threshold. Effectively, cascading
scheme can be viewed as a logical and of two independent
systems (see the separation of scores in cascading fusion
illustrated by Figure 7a). Strictly speaking, when considering
one PAD and one ASV systems, there are two variants of
cascading scheme: (i) when ASV is used first, followed by
PAD, and (ii) when PAD is used first, followed by ASV (see
Figure 2). Although these schemes are equivalent, i.e., and
operation is commutative, and they both lead to the same
filtering results (the same error rates), we consider variant (ii),
since it is defined in ISO/IEC 30107-1 standard [2].
When using a score level fusion for integrating ASV with
PAD, it is important to perform a thorough evaluation of
the combined/fused system to understand how incorporating
PAD affects verification accuracy for both real and spoofed
data. In this paper, we adopt an evaluation methodology
specifically designed for performance assessment of fusion
system proposed in [25].
6http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/mig/sre.cfm
4Fig. 4: AVspoof database recording setup.
III. SPOOFING DATABASES
Appropriate databases are necessary for testing different
presentation attack detection approaches. These databases need
to contain a set of practically feasible presentation attacks and
also data for speaker verification task, so that a verification
system can be tested for both issues: the accuracy of speaker
verification and the resistance to the attacks.
Currently, two comprehensive publicly available databases
exist that can be used for vulnerability analysis of ASV sys-
tems, the evaluation of PAD methods, and evaluation of joint
ASV-PAD systems: ASVspoof and AVspoof. Both databases
contain logical access attacks (LAs), while AVspoof also
contains presentation attacks (PAs). For the ease of comparison
with ASVspoof, the set of attacks in AVspoof is split into LA
and PA subsets (see Table I).
TABLE I: Number of utterances in different subsets of
AVspoof and ASVspoof databases.
Database Type of data Train Dev Eval
AVspoof enroll data 780 780 868
impostors 54509 54925 70620
real data 4973 4995 5576
LA attacks 17890 17890 20060
PA attacks 38580 38580 43320
ASVspoof enroll data - 175 230
impostors - 9975 18400
real data 3750 3497 9404
known attacks 12625 49875 92000
unknown attacks - - 92000
A. ASVspoof database
ASVspoof1 database was created for a 2015 Interspeech
anti-spoofing challenge [3]. It contains genuine speech data
from 106 speakers (45 male and 61 female), while spoofed
speech was generated using speech synthesis and voice con-
version algorithms. In total, database has 10 spoofing attacks,
five of which are considered ‘unknown’, since they appear in
the evaluation set only and hence PAD systems are not trained
on them.
B. AVspoof database
To our knowledge, the largest publicly available database
containing speech presentation attacks is AVspoof2 [5]. It
contains of genuine speech samples from 44 participants (31
males and 13 females) recorded over the period of two months
in four sessions, each scheduled several days apart in different
setups and environmental conditions. The recording devices,
including microphone AT2020USB+, Samsung Galaxy S4
phone, and iPhone 3GS, and the environments are shown in
Figure 4.
From the recorded genuine data, two major types of attacks
were created for AVspoof database: ‘logical access’ attacks
(LA for short), similar to those in ASVspoof database [3]
but generated using (i) a statistical parametric-based speech
synthesis algorithm [26] and (ii) a voice conversion algorithm
from Festvox7, and the presentation attacks (PA for short).
When generating presentation attacks, the assumption is that
a verification system is installed on a laptop (with an internal
built-in microphone) and an attacker is trying to gain access to
this system by playing back to it a pre-recorded genuine data or
an automatically generated synthetic data using some playback
device. In AVspoof database, presentation attacks consist of
(i) direct replay attacks when a genuine data is played back
using a laptop with internal speakers, a laptop with external
high quality speakers, Samsung Galaxy S4 phone, and iPhone
3G, (ii) synthesized speech replayed with a laptop, and (iii)
converted voice attacks replayed with a laptop.
C. Evaluation protocol
In a single database evaluation, the training (Train) subset
of a given database is used for training a PAD or an ASV
system. The development (Dev) set is used for determining
hyper-parameters of the system and evaluation (Eval) set is
used to test the system. In a cross-database evaluation, the
training and development sets are taken from one database,
while evaluation set is taken from another database. For PAD
systems, a cross-attack evaluation is also possible, when the
training and development sets contain one type of attack,
e.g., logical access attacks only, while evaluation set contains
another type, e.g., presentation or replay attacks only.
For evaluation of PAD systems, the following metrics are
recommended [27]: attack presentation classification error rate
7http://festvox.org/
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Fig. 5: Processing flow of considered individual PAD systems (as per systems in [6]).
(APCER) and bona fide presentation classification error rate
(BPCER). APCER is the number of attacks misclassified as
bona fide samples divided by the total number of attacks, and
is defined as follows:
APCER =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(1−Resi), (1)
where N represents the number of attack presentations. Resi
takes value 1 if the i-th presentation is classified as an attack
presentation, and value 0 if classified as a bona fide presenta-
tion. Thus, APCER can we considered as the equivalent to
FAR for PAD systems, as it reflects the observed ratio of
falsely accepted attack samples in relation to the total number
of presented attacks.
By definition, BPCER is the number of incorrectly classified
bona fide samples divided by the total number of bona fide
samples:
BPCER =
∑NBF
i=1 Resi
NBF
, (2)
where NBF represents the number of bona fide presentations,
and Resi is defined similar to APCER. Thus, BPCER can we
considered as the equivalent to FRR for PAD systems, as it
reflects the observed ratio of falsely rejected genuine samples
in relation to the total number of bona fide (genuine) samples.
We compute equal error rate (EER) as the rate when APCER
and BPCER are equal.
ASV and joint ASV-PAD systems are evaluated under
two operational scenarios: bona fide scenario with no attacks
and the goal to separate genuine samples from zero-effort
impostors and spoof scenario with the goal to separate genuine
samples from attacks. For bona fide scenario, we report false
match rate (FMR), which is similar to FAR, and false non-
match rate (FNMR), which is similar to FRR, while for spoof
scenario, we report impostor attack presentation match rate
(IAPMR), which is the proportion of attacks that incorrectly
accepted as genuine samples by the joint ASV-PAD system
(for details, see recommendations in ISO/IEC 30107-3 [27]).
When analyzing, comparing, and especially fusing PAD and
ASV systems, it is important that the scores are calibrated
in a form of likelihood ratio. Raw scores can be mapped to
log-likelihood ratio scores with logistic regression classifier
and an associated cost of calibration Cllr can be used as
an application-independent performance measure of calibrated
PAD or ASV system. For more details on the score calibration,
please refer to [28].
Therefore, in this paper, we report EER rates (on Eval set)
when testing the considered PAD systems on each database,
for the sake of consistency with the previous literature, no-
tably [6], and BPCER and APCER of PAD systems (using
the EER threshold computed on Dev set) when testing PADs
in cross-database scenario. EER has been commonly used
within the speech community to measure the performance of
ASV and PAD systems, while BPCER and APCER are the
newly standardized metrics and we advocate for the use of
the open evaluation standards in the literature. We also report
calibration cost Cllr and the discrimination loss Cminllr metrics
for the individual PAD systems. FMR, FNMR, and IAPMR are
reported for ASV and joint ASV-PAD systems on evaluation
set (using EER threshold computed on the development set).
IV. PAD SYSTEMS
The processing flow of considered presentation attack de-
tection systems is illustrated in Figure 5. Data from training,
development, and evaluation sets is first processed to extract
corresponding features. The systems mainly differ by the
features used for the classification, while the classification is
done using Gaussian mixture model (GMM)-based classifier
(as the best in [6]), which is trained separately for bona fide
and spoof data of the training set. The trained models are then
used to compute scores for the features from development
and evaluation sets as the difference between likelihoods to
the two GMM models [8]. Each GMM model is trained
using 10 expectation-maximization (EM) iterations and has
512 Gaussians components.
A. Individual PAD systems
We have selected several state of the art methods for attacks
detection in speech (please see Figure 5 for the schematic
overview), which were recently evaluated by Sahidullah et
al. [6] on ASVspoof database with an addition of CQCC
features based method [14].
We selected four cepstral-based features with rectangular
(RFCC), mel-scale triangular (MFCC) [10], inverted mel-scale
triangular (IMFCC), and linear triangular (LFCC) filters [11].
These features are computed from a power spectrum (power
of magnitude of 512-sized FFT) by applying one of the above
filters of a given size (we use size 20 as per [6]). We also
implemented spectral flux-based features (SSFC) [12], which
are Euclidean distances between power spectrums (normalized
by the maximum value) of two consecutive frames, subband
6TABLE II: Performance of PAD systems and their fused derivatives in terms of average EER (%), Cllr, and Cminllr of calibrated
scores for evaluation sets of ASVspoof [3] and AVspoof [5] databases.
PAD systems Fusion ASVspoof (Eval) AVspoof (Eval)
Known S10 Unknown LA PA
EER Cllr Cminllr EER EER Cllr C
min
llr EER Cllr C
min
llr EER Cllr C
min
llr
SCFC - 0.11 0.732 0.006 23.92 5.17 0.951 0.625 0.00 0.730 0.000 5.34 0.761 0.160
RFCC - 0.14 0.731 0.009 6.34 1.32 0.825 0.230 0.04 0.729 0.001 3.27 0.785 0.117
LFCC - 0.13 0.730 0.005 5.56 1.20 0.818 0.211 0.00 0.728 0.000 4.73 0.811 0.153
MFCC - 0.47 0.737 0.023 14.03 2.93 0.877 0.435 0.00 0.727 0.000 5.43 0.812 0.165
IMFCC - 0.20 0.730 0.007 5.11 1.57 0.804 0.192 0.00 0.728 0.000 4.09 0.797 0.137
SSFC - 0.27 0.733 0.016 7.15 1.60 0.819 0.251 0.70 0.734 0.027 4.70 0.800 0.160
SCMC - 0.19 0.731 0.009 6.32 1.37 0.812 0.229 0.01 0.728 0.000 3.95 0.805 0.141
CQCC - 0.10 0.732 0.008 1.59 0.58 0.756 0.061 0.66 0.733 0.028 3.84 0.796 0.128
8-fused-PADs Mean 0.04 0.732 0.003 1.74 0.37 0.828 0.077 0.00 0.729 0.000 3.10 0.793 0.111
LFCC-MFCC-SCFC Mean 0.07 0.733 0.004 7.24 1.48 0.877 0.256 0.00 0.728 0.000 4.82 0.791 0.150
CQCC-MFCC-SCFC Mean 0.03 0.734 0.003 2.14 0.46 0.854 0.088 0.00 0.730 0.000 3.96 0.786 0.129
CQCC-MFCC Mean 0.08 0.734 0.006 2.18 0.47 0.811 0.085 0.02 0.730 0.001 4.14 0.802 0.132
LFCC-MFCC Mean 0.13 0.733 0.005 7.08 1.46 0.845 0.249 0.00 0.728 0.000 5.08 0.811 0.153
IMFCC-MFCC Mean 0.15 0.734 0.006 6.26 1.29 0.838 0.219 0.00 0.728 0.000 4.09 0.803 0.133
SCFC-SCMC Mean 0.08 0.732 0.004 7.00 1.47 0.876 0.249 0.00 0.729 0.000 3.84 0.780 0.144
SCFC-CQCC Mean 0.03 0.732 0.002 1.82 0.50 0.844 0.071 0.05 0.732 0.002 3.72 0.775 0.129
8-fused-PADs LR 0.06 0.011 0.004 1.43 0.43 0.093 0.064 0.00 0.002 0.000 3.57 0.563 0.123
LFCC-MFCC-SCFC LR 0.07 0.014 0.003 6.43 1.34 0.517 0.234 0.00 0.000 0.000 4.43 0.513 0.151
CQCC-MFCC-SCFC LR 0.05 0.010 0.004 1.31 0.38 0.082 0.054 0.00 0.000 0.000 3.62 0.493 0.125
CQCC-MFCC LR 0.07 0.013 0.006 1.38 0.37 0.081 0.058 0.00 0.001 0.000 3.73 0.184 0.122
LFCC-MFCC LR 0.12 0.017 0.004 6.32 1.30 0.403 0.228 0.00 0.000 0.000 5.01 0.241 0.152
IMFCC-MFCC LR 0.13 0.018 0.006 5.63 1.19 0.327 0.200 0.00 0.001 0.000 3.84 0.326 0.130
SCFC-SCMC LR 0.07 0.016 0.004 7.34 1.54 0.506 0.257 0.00 0.001 0.000 3.82 0.482 0.149
SCFC-CQCC LR 0.05 0.010 0.003 1.46 0.47 0.086 0.057 0.02 0.005 0.000 3.70 0.493 0.129
8-fused-PADs PLR 50.10 5.534 0.096 61.71 53.55 9.811 0.732 0.00 0.000 0.000 3.39 1.175 0.115
LFCC-MFCC-SCFC PLR 0.14 0.030 0.011 6.44 1.43 0.372 0.240 0.00 0.000 0.000 4.41 0.993 0.148
CQCC-MFCC-SCFC PLR 50.09 4.879 0.056 57.62 52.25 6.338 0.592 0.00 0.000 0.000 3.70 0.974 0.124
CQCC-MFCC PLR 50.06 4.699 0.048 51.47 50.96 4.965 0.249 0.00 0.001 0.000 22.20 3.732 0.675
LFCC-MFCC PLR 0.16 0.036 0.010 5.43 1.17 0.286 0.207 0.00 0.005 0.000 4.43 0.191 0.147
IMFCC-MFCC PLR 0.19 0.035 0.012 5.03 1.13 0.256 0.190 0.00 0.002 0.000 3.83 0.238 0.124
SCFC-SCMC PLR 0.13 0.035 0.012 7.14 1.54 0.380 0.255 0.00 0.000 0.000 3.84 0.817 0.144
SCFC-CQCC PLR 50.08 4.671 0.049 52.23 51.20 5.037 0.342 0.00 0.005 0.000 3.75 0.855 0.128
centroid frequency (SCFC) [13], and subband centroid magni-
tude (SCMC) [13] features. A discrete cosine transform (DCT-
II) is applied to all above features, except for SCFC, and first
20 coefficients are taken.
Before computing selected features, a given audio sample is
first split into overlapping 20ms-long speech frames with 10ms
overlap. The frames are pre-emphasized with 0.97 coefficient
and pre-processed by applying Hamming window. Then, for
all features, we compute deltas and double-deltas [29] and
keep only these features (40 in total) for the classifier. We
kept only deltas and delta-deltas, because [6] reported that the
static features degraded performance of PAD systems.
In addition to the above features, we also consider recently
proposed CQCC [14], which are computed using constant Q
transform instead of FFT. To be consistent with the other
features and fair in the systems comparison, we used also only
delta and delta-deltas (40 features in total) derived from 19
plus C0 coefficients.
B. Fused PAD systems
In addition to eight individual PAD systems, we also used
parallel score fusion with logistic regression (LR), polynomial
logistic regression (PLR), and mean-based score classification
(Mean), algorithms to produce different combinations of joint
PAD systems. We limited all possible combinations of systems
to include first 8 PADs fused into one system, as well as,
various combinations with MFCC-based and CQCC-based
PADs as the most popular and the most recent features for
PAD, respectively. To avoid prior to the evaluations, the raw
scores from each individual PAD system are pre-calibrated
with logistic regression based on Platts sigmoid method [30]
by modeling scores of the training set and applying it on the
scores from development and evaluation sets.
V. EVALUATION OF PAD SYSTEMS
The selected PAD systems (see Section IV) and their fused
derivatives are evaluated on each ASVspoof and AVspoof
database and in cross-database scenario. To keep results com-
parable with previous work [6], [31], we computed average
EER (Eval set) for single database evaluations and APCER
with BPCER for cross-database evaluations. APCER with
BPCER are computed for Eval set of a given dataset using the
EER threshold obtained from the Dev set from another dataset
(see Table III). The calibration cost Cllr and the discrimination
loss Cminllr of the resulted calibrated scores are provided.
A. ASVspoof vs. AVspoof
The results of evaluating the selected methods on different
types of attacks from ASVspoof and AVspoof databases are
presented in Table II. These results are obtained by training
each PAD system on Train set of a given database, then tuned
on Dev set and tested on Eval set of the same database.
In Table II, the results for known and unknown attacks of
Eval set of ASVspoof are presented separately to demonstrate
the differences between these two types of attacks provided in
ASVspoof database. The main contribution to the higher EER
7TABLE III: Performance of PAD systems and their fused derivatives in terms of average APCER (%), BPCER (%), and Cllr
of calibrated scores in cross-database testing on ASVspoof [3] and AVspoof [5] databases.
PAD system Fusion ASVspoof (Train/Dev) AVspoof-LA (Train/Dev)
AVspoof-LA (Eval) AVspoof-PA (Eval) AVspoof-PA (Eval) ASVspoof (Eval)
APCER BPCER Cllr APCER BPCER Cllr APCER BPCER Cllr APCER BPCER Cllr
SCFC - 0.10 2.76 0.751 10.20 2.76 0.809 15.12 0.00 0.887 39.62 0.35 0.970
RFCC - 0.29 69.57 0.887 7.51 69.57 0.927 26.39 0.00 0.902 48.32 2.86 0.988
LFCC - 1.30 0.13 0.740 21.03 0.13 0.868 17.70 0.00 0.930 37.49 0.02 0.958
MFCC - 1.20 2.55 0.764 17.09 2.55 0.838 10.60 0.00 0.819 19.72 1.22 0.870
IMFCC - 4.57 0.00 0.761 92.98 0.00 1.122 99.14 0.00 1.164 43.00 0.60 0.966
SSFC - 4.81 64.47 0.899 18.89 64.47 0.973 71.84 0.68 1.047 63.45 23.54 1.070
SCMC - 0.75 1.70 0.750 22.61 1.70 0.866 15.94 0.00 0.861 45.97 0.01 0.978
CQCC - 13.99 57.05 0.968 66.29 57.05 1.191 44.65 0.61 1.009 0.86 100.00 1.009
8-fused-PADs Mean 0.41 12.73 0.804 12.46 12.73 0.930 19.71 0.00 0.944 26.97 5.25 0.959
LFCC-MFCC-SCFC Mean 0.21 0.39 0.750 11.08 0.39 0.835 11.48 0.00 0.876 23.23 0.21 0.929
CQCC-MFCC-SCFC Mean 0.20 36.78 0.817 11.54 36.78 0.929 18.38 0.00 0.900 3.67 35.77 0.924
CQCC-MFCC Mean 0.93 49.71 0.855 21.81 49.71 0.997 20.77 0.00 0.908 1.22 99.74 0.914
LFCC-MFCC Mean 0.88 0.52 0.751 16.78 0.52 0.851 10.92 0.00 0.872 21.33 0.55 0.911
IMFCC-MFCC Mean 1.36 0.34 0.761 25.91 0.34 0.967 13.29 0.00 0.978 21.82 0.81 0.914
SCFC-SCMC Mean 0.13 0.82 0.750 11.51 0.82 0.835 17.59 0.00 0.873 41.39 0.03 0.971
SCFC-CQCC Mean 0.17 49.86 0.848 12.94 49.86 0.980 28.70 0.02 0.945 1.46 99.91 0.960
8-fused-PADs LR 11.68 56.08 9.207 60.57 56.08 9.532 20.34 0.00 1.694 15.09 36.36 1.487
LFCC-MFCC-SCFC LR 0.17 0.27 0.041 11.53 0.27 0.292 10.79 0.00 0.655 20.90 0.45 1.179
CQCC-MFCC-SCFC LR 9.41 55.76 8.272 57.63 55.76 8.579 14.10 0.00 0.878 14.90 1.98 0.596
CQCC-MFCC LR 11.09 56.33 9.086 61.11 56.33 9.626 13.67 0.00 0.824 1.51 94.73 0.427
LFCC-MFCC LR 0.87 0.38 0.046 16.18 0.38 0.374 10.82 0.00 0.618 20.93 0.64 1.129
IMFCC-MFCC LR 1.55 0.04 0.049 35.24 0.04 0.553 12.92 0.00 0.650 21.48 0.81 0.973
SCFC-SCMC LR 0.11 0.77 0.098 11.38 0.77 0.324 17.34 0.00 0.826 41.21 0.03 1.933
SCFC-CQCC LR 9.51 55.49 8.494 57.70 55.49 8.760 26.14 0.00 1.636 2.82 99.45 0.761
8-fused-PADs PLR 38.74 0.38 5.159 93.11 0.38 8.552 12.23 0.04 1.130 8.95 29.64 1.345
LFCC-MFCC-SCFC PLR 0.55 0.20 0.162 13.10 0.20 0.368 10.54 0.00 0.743 19.96 0.65 1.226
CQCC-MFCC-SCFC PLR 31.04 1.95 3.662 88.15 1.95 6.532 11.79 0.00 0.856 14.39 2.30 0.568
CQCC-MFCC PLR 28.98 45.62 8.961 85.07 45.62 10.210 11.91 0.00 0.764 11.50 8.57 0.397
LFCC-MFCC PLR 1.01 0.16 0.062 17.97 0.16 0.338 10.70 0.00 0.691 20.47 0.71 1.173
IMFCC-MFCC PLR 2.70 0.00 0.062 74.61 0.00 0.442 12.17 0.00 0.669 20.67 0.91 0.944
SCFC-SCMC PLR 0.07 1.69 0.499 10.36 1.69 0.660 15.86 0.00 0.918 39.87 0.04 2.249
SCFC-CQCC PLR 28.97 38.77 6.311 85.53 38.77 9.109 21.92 0.00 1.745 23.20 7.19 1.166
of unknown is given by a more challenging attack ‘S10’ of
the Eval set (see column ‘S10’ of Table II for the results for
this attack).
Since AVspoof contains both logical access (LA for short)
and presentation attacks (PA), the results for these two types
of attacks are also presented separately. Hence, it allows to
compare the performance on ASVspoof database (it has logical
access attacks only) with AVspoof-LA attacks.
From the results in Table II, we can note that (i) LA set of
AVspoof is less challenging compared to ASVspoof for almost
all methods, (ii) unknown attacks and, especially, ‘S10’ attack,
for which PADs are not trained, are more challenging, and (iii)
presentation attacks are also more challenging compared to LA
attacks.
It can be also noted that PAD systems fused using a simple
Mean fusion are on par or sometimes performing even better
than systems fused with LR (though, LR generally leads to
lower Cllr compared to Mean). A probable reason for this is
the performed pre-calibration of the scores using logistic re-
gression. Calibration insures that the scores are well distributed
within [0, 1] range, leading to similar EER-based thresholds
among individual PAD systems. Hence, Mean, which can be
considered as a special case of LR, leads to ‘good enough’
fusion results.
B. Cross-database evaluation
Table III presents the cross-database results when a given
PAD system is trained and tuned using Train and Dev sets
from one database but is tested using Eval set from another
database. For instance, results in the second column of the
table are obtained by using training and development sets
from ASVspoof database but evaluation set from AVspoof-LA.
Also, we evaluated the effect of using one type of attacks (e.g.,
logical access from AVspoof-LA) for training and another
type (e.g., presentation attacks of AVspoof-PA) for testing (the
results are in the last column of the table).
From Table III, we can note that all methods generalize
poorly across different datasets with BPCER reaching 100%,
for example, especially, CQCC-based PAD showing poor per-
formance for all cross-database evaluations. It is also interest-
ing to note that even similar methods, for instance, RFCC and
LFCC-based, have very different accuracy in cross-database
testing, even though they showed less drastic difference in
single-database evaluations (see Table II).
VI. ASV SYSTEMS
We consider two ASV systems based on inter-session
variability (ISV) modeling [15] and i-vectors [16], which
are the state of the art speaker verification systems able
to effectively deal with intra-class and inter-class variability.
In these systems, voice activity detection is based on the
modulation of the energy around 4Hz, the features include 20
MFCCs and energy, with their first and second derivatives, and
modeling was performed with 256 Gaussian components using
25 EM iterations. In i-vectors based system, the dimension
of i-vectors is 100. Universal background model (UBM) was
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Fig. 6: Histogram distributions of uncalibrated scores of i-vector ASV and MFCC-based PAD systems.
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Fig. 7: A scatter plot and histogram distributions of uncalibrated scores and DET curves of calibrated scores of joint i-vector
ASV with MFCC-based PAD system via cascading fusion (see the row in italic for i-vector system in Table IV).
trained using training set of MOBIO database8, while the
clients were enrolled using corresponding genuine enrollment
data of development and evaluation sets of AVspoof database.
Since our main focus is on presentation attacks, we evaluate
ASV and ASV-PAD joint systems on presentation attacks of
AVspoof database, i.e., considering AVspoof-PA subset only.
A. Vulnerability of ASV to presentation attacks
Table IV demonstrates how i-vectors (‘no fusion’ row) and
ISV-based (‘no fusion’ row) ASV systems perform in two
different scenarios: (i) when there are no attacks present (zero-
impostors only), referred as bona fide scenario (defined by
ISO/IEC [27]), and (ii) when the system is being spoofed with
presentation attacks, referred as spoof scenario. Histograms
of score distribution in Figure 6b also illustrate the effect
of attacks on i-vectors based ASV system in spoof scenario,
compared to bona fide scenario in Figure 6a.
From Table IV, it can be noted that both ASV systems
perform relatively well under bona fide scenario with ISV-
based system showing lower FMR of 4.46%. However, when
a spoofed data is introduced, without a PAD system in place,
the IAPMR significantly increases reaching 92.41% for ISV-
based and 94.04% for i-vectors based systems. It means that a
typical verification system is not able to correctly distinguish
presentation attacks from genuine data.
8https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/mobio
B. Integration of PAD with ASV
As described in Section IV, multiple presentation attack
detection systems have been considered to detect whether a
given speech sample is genuine or spoofed. However, the
purpose of a PAD system is to work in tandem with a
verification system, so that the joint system can effectively
separate the genuine data from both zero-effort impostors
(genuine data but incorrect identity) and presentation attacks
(spoofed data for the correct identity).
In this section, we evaluate cascading and parallel score
fusion of integrating ASV with different PAD systems. It is
important to understand the main differences between these
two schemes (see Figure 2 and Figure 3 for illustration). In
cascading approach, each system, PAD and ASV, are trained
and tuned independently on their respective training and devel-
opment sets, including determining relevant thresholds on the
development set. These system parameters (e.g., thresholds)
are used to filter samples from the evaluation set by first
applying PAD threshold to reject mostly spoofed data (hence,
accepting most of the genuine and zero-effort impostor data),
and then applying ASV threshold to reject mostly zero-effort
impostors (see scatter plot in Figure 7a for illustration). In the
end, only the desired genuine samples are accepted. It means
that once these parameters are chosen for each system, they
cannot be later changed for the joint ASV-PAD system, even
if the requirements to FAR or FRR may change. By contrast,
parallel scheme considers both ASV and PAD systems jointly
9TABLE IV: Fusing i-vector and ISV-based verification systems with the selected PAD systems (highlighted in bold in Table III)
on evaluation set of AVspoof database.
ASV system Fused with PAD Type of fusion Zero-impostors only PAs only
FMR (%) FNMR (%) IAPMR (%)
no fusion - 4.46 9.90 92.41
ISV-based 8-fused-PAD (Mean) Cascade 4.99 9.62 1.79
8-fused-PAD (Mean) Mean 7.31 13.40 1.74
8-fused-PAD (Mean) LR 8.15 13.70 1.55
8-fused-PAD (Mean) PLR 4.96 9.09 2.40
LFCC-MFCC-SCFC (LR) Cascade 5.80 10.73 3.24
LFCC-MFCC-SCFC (LR) Mean 4.46 9.94 5.40
LFCC-MFCC-SCFC (LR) LR 4.49 10.00 5.11
LFCC-MFCC-SCFC (LR) PLR 4.77 9.98 98.04
MFCC Cascade 6.57 12.00 4.19
MFCC Mean 23.05 22.73 28.98
MFCC LR 25.40 24.72 2.68
MFCC PLR 4.97 10.75 5.17
no fusion - 8.85 8.31 94.04
i-vectors based 8-fused-PAD (Mean) Cascade 9.45 8.05 1.52
8-fused-PAD (Mean) Mean 12.15 11.77 1.46
8-fused-PAD (Mean) LR 8.72 8.20 95.03
8-fused-PAD (Mean) PLR 17.47 23.30 98.71
MFCC Cascade 10.83 11.45 3.89
LFCC-MFCC-SCFC (LR) Cascade 10.14 9.77 2.84
LFCC-MFCC-SCFC (LR) Mean 8.84 8.37 4.92
LFCC-MFCC-SCFC (LR) LR 8.78 8.45 97.50
LFCC-MFCC-SCFC (LR) PLR 8.95 8.41 97.62
MFCC Mean 26.33 19.44 19.47
MFCC LR 8.77 8.33 94.28
MFCC PLR 9.60 10.47 95.76
and allows to tune all parameters of the system at the time
of the fusion, including the fusion algorithm that separates
genuine subset from the rest of the data in the joint scores
and the threshold selected on the joint scores. It means that
in parallel scheme, depending on the requirements to the final
system, FMR and FMNR values can be fine-tuned for each
genuine, zero-effort impostor, or attack data.
Based on the results in individual and cross-database eval-
uations, we have selected 3 PAD systems that performed the
most well consistently across all databases and attacks: 8-fused
PADs fused via Mean score-fusion, LFCC-MFCC-SCFC fused
via LR, and a simple MFCC-based PAD. These systems are
highlighted in bold in Table II and Table III.
As results presented in Table IV demonstrate, integration
with PAD system can effectively reduce IAPMR from above
90% of the ASV (both ISV-based and i-vector) to IAPMR
down to 1.52%, which is the best performing joint system
of i-vector ASV fused with 8-fused PAD via cascade fusion.
Such drastic improvement in the attack detection comes with
an increase in FMR (from 4.46% to 4.99% when ASV is ISV
and from 8.85% to 9.45% when ASV is i-vector).
From the Table IV, it is clear that 8-fused PAD fused
with both ASV systems via cascading scheme leads to more
superior overall performance. However, a simple MFCC-based
PAD system also performs reasonably well when fused with
ASV via cascade fusion (see Figure 7c for DET plots in
different scenarios), although. An important practical advan-
tage of using MFCC-based PAD is that MFCC are the most
commonly used fast to compute features in speech processing.
We highlighted the results for MFCC-based PAD in Table IV
in italic and illustrated its performance with scatter plot in
Figure 7a, histogram distributions in Figure 7b, and DET
curves in Figure 7c.
The Table IV shows that cascading fusion mostly leads
to a better overall performance compared to parallel scheme.
However, compared to a cascading scheme, where each fused
system is independent and has to be tuned separately for
disjoint set of parameter requirements, parallel scheme is
more flexible, because it allows to tune several parameters
of the fusion, as if it was one single system consisting of
interdependent components. Such flexibility can be valuable
in practical systems. See [25] for a detailed comparison of the
different fusion schemes and their discussion.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we conducted a cross-database evaluation of
several state of the art speech presentation attack detection
methods and their different score fusion-based derivatives im-
plemented as open source. We used two recent comprehensive
databases with speech spoofing attacks: ASVspoof (‘logical
access’ attacks only) and AVspoof (‘logical access’ and pre-
sentation attacks). The results demonstrated that the evaluated
PAD systems generalize poorly across different databases and
data.
We also considered score-based integration of several PAD
and ASV systems following both cascading and parallel
schemes. Evaluation results show a significantly increased
resistance of joined ASV-PAD systems to presentation attacks
from AVspoof database. Cascading fusion leads to a better
overall performance compared to parallel scheme.
In the future, we will focus on the development of novel
presentation attacks, especially targeting mobile environment,
since so far the attack devices that run an ASV system are as-
sumed to be laptops. We will also explore multimodal systems,
when both ASV and PAD systems of different modalities, e.g.,
speech and video, are integrated to improve the performance
in both bona fide and spoof scenarios. And we will investi-
gate whether deep learning approaches for presentation attack
10
detection can lead to higher detection accuracies and whether
they can generalize better in cross-database scenario compared
to more traditional approaches.
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